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Background: Confidential product listing agreements (PLAs) negotiated between pharmaceutical manufacturers
and individual health care payers may contribute to unwanted price disparities, high administrative costs, and
unequal bargaining power within and across jurisdictions. In the context of Canada’s decentralized health system,
we aimed to document provincial policy makers’ perceptions about collaborative PLA negotiations.
Methods: We conducted semi-structured telephone interviews with a senior policy maker from nine of the ten
Canadian provinces. We conducted a thematic analysis of interview transcripts to identify benefits, drawbacks, and
barriers to routine collaboration on PLA negotiations.
Results: Canadian policy makers expressed support for joint negotiations of PLAs in principle, citing benefits of
increased bargaining power and reduced inter-jurisdictional inequities in drug prices and formulary listings.
However, established policy institutions and the politics of individual jurisdictional authority are formidable barriers
to routine PLA collaboration. Achieving commitment to a joint process may be difficult to sustain among
heterogeneous and autonomous partners.
Conclusions: Though collaboration on PLA negotiation is an extension of collaboration on health technology
assessment, it is a very significant next step that requires harmonization of the outcomes of decision-making
processes. Views of policy makers in Canada suggest that sustaining routine collaborations on PLA negotiations
may be difficult unless participating jurisdictions have similar policy institutions, capacities to implement coverage
decisions, and local political priorities.
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To avoid the negative effects of widely-used external
reference pricing policies, manufacturers are placing
tighter restrictions on list prices for prescription drugs
[1-3]. Final drug prices are therefore increasingly deter-
mined by confidential contracts negotiated between drug
plans and manufacturers [4,5]. The secrecy of negotiated
price rebates effectively segments the market, allowing
firms to price discriminate across payers. This gives
payers an opportunity for savings but also creates new
challenges related to negotiation and enforcement.* Correspondence: morgan@chspr.ubc.ca
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reproduction in any medium, provided the orWhile there are several examples of inter-jurisdictional
cooperation on health technology assessment (HTA) for
drug coverage decision-making [6-8], there have been few
instances of inter-jurisdictional cooperation on price nego-
tiations. However, to increase purchasing power, reduce
administrative costs, and prevent unwanted price dispa-
rities across payers, cooperation on price negotiation
might be justified in some cases. Canada offers an illustra-
tive example.
Canada differs from some other federal states, such as
Italy or Australia, where pharmaceutical pricing policies
are centralized with a national authority. Responsibility
for health care in Canada is devolved to its ten pro-
vinces, which vary considerably in population size and
income – see Table 1. Prescription drug coverage policyl Ltd. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
ommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
iginal work is properly cited.




per capita (CAD$, 2010)
Total prescription drug expenditure
per capita (CAD$, 2011)
Share of total prescription
drug expenditure financed by
provincial government (2011)
Canada (total) 34,482,779 $47,000 $788 38%
Ontario 13,372,996 $46,000 $785 43%
Quebec 7,979,663 $40,000 $912 33%
British Columbia 4,573,321 $44,000 $575 36%
Alberta 3,779,353 $70,000 $725 45%
Manitoba 1,250,574 $43,000 $710 34%
Saskatchewan 1,057,884 $60,000 $799 38%
Nova Scotia 945,437 $38,000 $985 34%
New Brunswick 755,455 $39,000 $937 26%
Newfoundland and
Labrador
510,578 $55,000 $920 32%
Prince Edward Island 145,855 $34,000 $791 31%
Sources: Authors’ analysis of data from Canadian Institute for Health Information and Statistics Canada.
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incentives to promote consistency of public drug cover-
age across provinces [9]. As a result, each province
independently operates limited public drug benefit pro-
grams. These programs vary widely in structure and
account for 26 to 45% of prescription drug expendi-
tures in their provinces, leaving a significant role for
private financing through insurance and out-of-pocket
payments. All provinces except Quebec cooperate on
health technology assessment for public drug cover-
age decision-making [7]; however, they remain re-
sponsible for their own coverage decisions and price
negotiations.
Price contracts for pharmaceuticals are known as
product listing agreements (PLAs) in Canada. Prior to
approximately 2006, they were seldom ever used by any
province. Today, use of PLAs varies widely across pro-
vinces: they are virtually never used in Quebec and
Newfoundland and Labrador; they are used for virtually
all drugs covered by the public drug plans in Ontario
and Manitoba; and they are used to varying degrees in
other provinces.
In 2010, provincial premiers announced that a Pan-
Canadian Purchasing Alliance would facilitate joint
price negotiations among interested provinces [10].
Joint negotiations related to three drugs had taken place
by mid-2012 [11]. Such collaboration indicates potential
for joint PLA negotiations; however, it is not yet clear
whether PLA collaboration can be sustained and applied
universally to new medicines as is collaboration on
HTA. We therefore sought to explore provincial policy
makers’ views of the benefits and drawbacks of joint
negotiations and the potential barriers to making such
collaborations routine.Methods
After ethics review and approval, we conducted tele-
phone interviews with purposefully selected provincial
drug plan executives. In January 2012, we sent study
invitations to each of the ten provincial drug plans. Invi-
tations were sent to the most senior executive within
each plan or, where identifiable, the executive respon-
sible for contract negotiations. Invitees were asked to
participate in a telephone interview or to identify an ap-
propriate individual to speak on behalf of their jurisdic-
tion. Nine provinces agreed to participate; only one
province, Newfoundland and Labrador, declined.
Seven of the nine policy makers interviewed had
worked with their respective drug plans for at least five
years. The other two policy makers were hired more re-
cently to manage new PLA negotiation processes in
their jurisdictions. All policy makers from provinces
that had used PLAs had direct experience with PLA
negotiations and related inter-provincial collaboration
efforts.
The confidential nature of PLAs meant that policy
makers could not be asked to comment on particular
negotiations or signed PLAs. Participants were there-
fore asked to describe the general benefits and draw-
backs of collaboration on PLA negotiation and to
provide their opinion about the barriers and facilitators
to collaborating on a routine basis. Additional file 1
contains the interview guide.
Interviews lasted an average of 40 minutes (range 28
to 54 minutes), and were recorded and transcribed for
thematic analysis [12]. All four authors read all tran-
scripts and independently identified themes that
emerged from the text. Authors met and jointly devel-
oped a coding scheme that then was used by two
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discrepancies were resolved through consensus or by
consulting the lead author.
Results
Table 2 lists the benefits, drawbacks and barriers to joint
PLA negotiation most commonly mentioned by partici-
pating policy makers. Key themes are described here.
Benefits of collaboration
Policy makers from all participating provinces expressed
general support for collaborative PLA negotiations. Seven
of the nine policy makers participating in our study noted
that the increased bargaining power achieved through col-
lective negotiations would likely lead to lower prices and
cost savings for participating jurisdictions (see Table 2).
Several policy makers noted that this benefit would not be
shared equally as price savings are likely to be greatest for
the smaller provinces, which in isolation have lower bar-
gaining power due to population size.
Five policy makers also explicitly identified interprovin-
cial price consistency as a benefit of a joint negotiation
process. Under the current system of independent nego-
tiations, policy makers in several provinces expressed con-
cerns that manufacturers may provide the first and mostTable 2 Most frequently mentioned themes concerning
the benefits, drawbacks, and obstacles to collaboration




theme (n = 9)
Benefits
Increased bargaining power 7
Provincial equity in price 5
Provincial equity in access 5
Administrative efficiency 2
Increased access, can fund more drugs 1
Drawbacks
Delay/length of process 5
Reduction in provincial autonomy 4
Savings may be lost for large provinces 2
Resource-intensive 2
Decreased access in some jurisdictions 1
Barriers
Differences in policy institutions 6
Provincial and/or federal will 6
Differences structure of drug benefit programs 5
Technical and administrative resources 5
Political acceptability of the decision 4generous price concessions to one or two large provinces,
increasing political pressure on other provinces to provide
coverage. This strategy, known as whipsawing, could force
small provinces – with limited negotiating capacity and
purchasing power – to pay the highest prices. Policy
makers from five provinces – large and small – stated
PLA collaboration may be one way of addressing this issue
and improving interprovincial equity in medicine prices
and access. As a policy maker from one of the larger pro-
vinces stated, by working together, provinces could
“. . .break down barriers [to access] wherein depending on
where you live, you may have different access to medica-
tions” (Interviewee #6).Drawbacks from collaboration
Policy makers from five of the participating provinces
expressed concerns that joint negotiations might increase
the time it takes to list a drug on provincial formularies.
They argued that multilateral negotiations, by nature of
the number of stakeholders at the table, would require
more time than bilateral negotiations. Two policy makers
also noted that joint negotiations may require more
resources overall because each jurisdiction would still
need to bear the cost of evaluating and adapting PLAs for
the local health system and policy framework.
Perceived loss of provincial autonomy was one the most
cited drawbacks of joint negotiations. This included
concerns about lines of accountability for PLA decisions
that often have significant budget impacts. It also included
considerations related to the ability of individual jurisdic-
tions to respond to the varying politics of their jurisdic-
tion, each with different political parties, priorities, and
dominant interest groups. One policy maker noted that
“politicians have different pressures at different times”
(Interviewee #3) making it difficult to predict whether a
jointly negotiated PLA will have local support.Barriers to expanded collaboration
Institutional barriers
Policy makers from six provinces mentioned institutional
barriers to routine collaboration on PLA negotiations, ran-
ging from constitutional authority over health care to local
policy processes. Related to the former, several policy
makers noted that provinces have independent authority
for health care policy and related decision-making. It was
argued that co-operation among the autonomous pro-
vinces is difficult without financial incentives from the
federal government. Reflecting more local considerations,
policy makers also noted that drug coverage decision-
making processes vary considerably across provinces.
While some provinces cede coverage decisions to execu-
tives responsible for public drug programs, others require
ministerial or even cabinet approval. These differences
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ments in ways that might impede routine collaboration.
Policy makers from five provinces also cited institutional
variations in provincial drug benefit structures as a barrier
to routine collaboration on PLA negotiation. Given that
some provinces provide comprehensive coverage for the
elderly and the poor and others only cover residents
against “catastrophic” drug costs, the coverage priorities,
decision-making frameworks, and even bargaining posi-
tions will differ significantly from province to province.
One policy maker went so far as to conclude that joint
negotiations are unlikely to become commonplace unless
all participating provinces offered comparable drug benefit
plans: “Fundamentally, you’ve got to have the same drug
benefit plan before you actually negotiate together”
(Interviewee #5).
Political barriers
Political will was one of the most frequently mentioned
obstacles to routine collaboration on PLA negotiation.
Policy makers from several provinces felt that joint
negotiations are likely to be explicitly or implicitly driven
by larger provinces – because they have the greatest pur-
chasing power and political influence – and that this
would not sit well with some governments. Reflecting
the constitutional autonomy mentioned above, some
policy makers said that provinces would not voluntarily
cede the decision-making authority required to sustain
joint PLA negotiations. As one policy maker stated,
“[you have to] give one group authority to make decisions
that would be binding on all provinces, which isn’t going
to happen” (Interviewee #7).
Related to the broader concerns about political will, pol-
icy makers from four provinces cited concerns about the
local political acceptability of final listing decisions that
would result from a joint negotiation. Two of these policy
makers specifically noted that there is a risk of provinces
circumventing the collective process on a drug-by-drug
basis, either by pursuing individual negotiations or by
“cherry-picking” only those jointly-negotiated PLAs that
suit their interest. Though acting in the interest of one’s
own jurisdiction is the primary responsibility of provincial
policy makers, such outcomes were viewed as significant
threats to the effectiveness and sustainability of routine
joint negotiations.
Resource barriers
Policy makers from five of the participating provinces
cited scarcity of required resources as a barrier to expan-
ding joint PLA negotiations. As stated above, some policy
makers felt that joint processes, at least currently, repre-
sent an increase in negotiation costs. Some provincial
policy makers argued that the federal government should
support the infrastructure required for collaborationamong the provinces. They also noted that this was un-
likely given the federal government’s current spending
priorities and fiscal constraints.
Discussion
Policy makers from Canadian provinces express general
support for joint PLA negotiations. Despite support
in principle, none suggested that routine collaborations
would be sustainable at present because of variations in
existing policy institutions and politics. This view might
be surprising given the longstanding collaborations among
all but one province on health technology assessment
related to drug coverage decision-making [7]. However, a
critical difference in these processes is that collaboration
on health technology assessment harmonizes the evidence
underpinning coverage decisions while collaboration on
PLA negotiations effectively harmonizes the coverage
decisions. To provide firms with maximum incentive to
negotiate better deals than would be the case in independ-
ent negotiations, a PLA collaboration has to result in con-
sistent funding decisions: failure to reach agreeable terms
through joint negotiations must result in a “no” listing de-
cision by all participating drug plans, and a successful joint
negotiation must result in a “yes” decision. Achieving and
sustaining such commitment to joint decision-making is a
formidable challenge.
The insights provided to us by policy makers from
Canadian provinces illustrate that joint negotiations may
break down for a number of reasons. Acting in self-
interest, payers may perceive that a better (or faster) deal
can be achieved by negotiating independently or may
resort to “cherry picking” their commitment to joint nego-
tiations. Manufacturers may even have incentive to try to
break a negotiation alliance by offering side deals in the
hope that individual drug plans could be played against
each other.
Beyond these self-interested incentives to defect,
policymakers expressed greater concern that solidarity in
negotiations would break down as a result of institutional
and political barriers. Willingness to implement consistent
funding decisions through joint negotiations requires, at
least, that participating drug plans have comparable
decision-making frameworks and negotiating leverage. Dif-
ferences in policies as simple as decision-making protocols
can limit the potential for routine collaboration. Variations
in the benefit structure of drug programs – that is, who is
covered and with what types of user charges-are even more
important because they may be more costly to harmonize
and they have a more profound effect on decision-making
frameworks. This raises the broader issue of the politics of
decision making autonomy and accountability.
Being committed to the decision-making outcomes
associated with joint PLA negotiations requires that
decision-making autonomy be ceded to a collective
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cause different governments have different health care
priorities and competing interests, such as attracting or
retaining pharmaceutical industry investment. It was not
stated explicitly by any policy makers in our study, but
variations in provincial incomes and, therefore, govern-
ments’ revenue generating powers will also affect the
acceptability of centralized decisions. Given the signifi-
cant economic disparity among negotiation partners,
some participating jurisdictions may simply not be able
to “afford” to commit to collective decisions.
Limitations
Our study is not without limitations. First, we only inter-
viewed one policy maker in each province. These policy
makers were senior executives and managers with direct
experience related to PLA negotiations and related
collaborative efforts, or direct experience with drug
coverage decision-making if PLAs were not used in their
province. Their views are those of people closely
engaged in the file but will not necessarily reflect views
of other officials, such as ministers or deputy ministers
of health. As with any study of this kind, the views
expressed by respondents represent a snapshot of per-
ceptions in a complex policy arena. Policy makers’ per-
ceptions will evolve as provinces’ gain more experience
with PLAs and related cooperative efforts. Finally, we
are aware that interview responses may have been influ-
enced by social desirability bias. In an effort to mitigate
that bias, participants were informed that our study
would not attribute themes or quotes to specific pro-
vinces or speakers unless absolutely necessary and only
after consent was provided.
Conclusions
Joint negotiation of PLAs may be seen as a logical exten-
sion of inter-jurisdictional cooperation on health tech-
nology assessment; however, the extension is arguably a
significant leap, one requiring a move from collaboration
simply on decision-making processes to collaboration on
decision-making outcomes. Canada’s experience suggests
that building and sustaining a PLA negotiation alliance
will likely require more than simple commitment to
avoid defection due to self-interest. Differences in policy
institutions, political pressures, and economic opportun-
ities of participating jurisdictions can place considerable
strain on a joint negotiation process.
Choice of “negotiating partner” is a key determinant of ef-
fective, routine collaboration on PLA negotiations. Sustain-
ing routine collaborations on a voluntary basis will require
partners with similar drug plans, compatible priorities for
health care and industrial development, and comparable in-
come levels. Whether across provinces in Canada or across
countries internationally, such collaborations would addresssome of the shortcomings of by increasing purchasing
power and administrative efficiencies among negotiation
partners. They would not, however, address concerns about
global disparities in drug prices that might arise in the new
paradigm of confidential drug pricing.
To promote equity in negotiation processes and out-
comes in a federation such as Canada, it would be possible
for the federal government to either centralize this policy
file as is done in countries like Italy and Australia, or to ac-
tively encourage collaborations among disparate states/pro-
vinces. Given the politics of jurisdictional responsibility in
Canada, centralization is unlikely. The Canadian govern-
ment could, however, exercise its spending power to en-
courage collaboration. By sharing part of the cost of the
negotiation process and related funding decisions, condi-
tional on provinces harmonizing the structures of drug
benefit programs, it could incentivize participation while
equalizing decision-making frameworks and addressing in-
come disparities that limit voluntary efforts by provinces.
While centralization by way of vertical policy integra-
tion is possible in the context of a federation, it is not
possible across countries. It will therefore be more diffi-
cult to improve equity in drug pricing across nations
with disparate income levels. If the new global pricing
paradigm is resulting in increasingly inflated list prices
for medicines, mechanisms will be needed to assist less
wealthy countries in negotiations, co-ordinated through
agencies such as the World Health Organization.Additional file
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